Press Release

DBRS Morningstar Confirms Ratings on GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2018-HULA

CMBS
October 15, 2020

DBRS, Inc. (DBRS Morningstar) confirmed the ratings on all classes of the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-HULA issued by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2018-HULA as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar has also maintained all classes Under Review with Negative Implications, given the negative impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) on the underlying collateral.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its “North American Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology” (the NA SASB Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are assigned to and/or monitored for North American single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions, and credit tenant lease transactions. For further information on the NA SASB Methodology, please see the press release dated March 1, 2020, at www.dbrsmorningstar.com. On March 27, 2020, DBRS Morningstar placed the ratings on its outstanding SASB transactions secured by hospitality properties Under Review with Negative Implications as the global shelter-in-place and travel restrictions related to the coronavirus have had an extreme impact on the short-term performance of this asset class. For further information on these rating actions, please see the DBRS Morningstar press release dated March 27, 2020.

As it reviewed the ratings for this transaction, DBRS Morningstar considered both the impact of the updated NA SASB Methodology and its scenarios attributable to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic on the ratings.

Because of the coronavirus’ significant impact on hospitality performance, DBRS Morningstar first considered the application of the updated NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the “North American CMBS Surveillance Methodology” to arrive at a baseline result, which incorporated qualitative assumptions, capitalization rates, and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio sizing benchmark quality/volatility adjustments and excluded any potential changes in current or future expected asset performance resulting from the coronavirus.

DBRS Morningstar then overlaid scenarios incorporating market value declines (MVDs) consistent with the projections in its “Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: September Update” published on September 10, 2020, on top of the baseline result to determine the impact of coronavirus-related changes in asset performance on the subject transaction on a tranche-by-tranche basis. For more information on these stress scenarios, please refer to the Coronavirus Impact Analysis section of this document. The global macroeconomic scenarios include a moderate decline of 15% for all commercial real estate (CRE), which acts as an average for all CRE property types. However, DBRS Morningstar expects a higher stress for hospitality properties, ranging from 25% to 45% based on the type of demand segmentation and asset location, and expects corporate demand and remote fly-to locations to be at the higher end of the value decline.

LOAN/PROPERTY OVERVIEW
The subject transaction originally closed in July 2018, with an original trust balance of $350 million. The transaction is backed by the Four Seasons Resort Hualālai, a luxury hotel and resort located on the Big Island of Hawaii. The collateral consists of a 243-key resort spread across 39 acres, a private membership club, and at issuance, 250 acres of residential resort community. With the exception of the residential lots, the collateral is subject to a ground lease. The underlying land is owned by the Trustees of the Estate of Bernice Pauahi Bishop. The ground lease expires in December 2061, with no renewal options. The borrower pays a minimum rent of $4.2 million and a percentage of revenue through December 2026.

Loan proceeds of $450.0 million were used to retire outstanding debt of $373.3 million (includes the $300.0 million commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) mortgage loan securitized in GSCCRE 2015-HULA), to return $62.2 million of equity to the sponsor and cover reserves as well as closing and origination costs. Total financing includes an additional $100 million B-note held outside the trust.

The resort has experienced a large decline in performance in recent years due to the eruption of the Kilauea volcano in 2018. The disruption in tourism on the island has caused net cash flow (NCF) to decline by 30% from DBRS Morningstar’s assumed NCF at issuance. While the property was more than 50 miles away from the volcano and not physically impacted, many already-booked guests cancelled or postponed their trip to the resort.

The hotel experienced sharp declines in tourism for most of 2018 and through the first half of 2019. According to multiple news reports, the island as a whole has experienced decreases in occupancy and average daily rate (ADR), which has resulted in lower revenue per available room (RevPAR) in the first half of 2019, compared with the year prior. However, it is noteworthy that, even with the market challenges, the subject continues to drastically outperform its competitive set in terms of ADR and RevPAR, consistent with its elite brand and offerings as the only high-end luxury resort on the island. It is DBRS Morningstar’s opinion that the true competitive set for the subject consists of luxury resorts found on Hawaii’s other islands.

The hotel's website states that in light of the latest coronavirus guidelines and the uncertainty of the re-opening of the state to travelers, Four Seasons Resort Hualalai will be focusing on a property-wide renovation and is accepting reservations for stays from December 1, 2020, onward.

According to the trailing 12-month March 2020 STR report, the property's occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR were 75%, $1,285, and $936, respectively, compared to the competitive set average reported figures of 78.0%, $407, and $318, respectively. These figures for the subject represent a 2% increase in occupancy, a 1% increase in ADR, and a 12% increase in RevPAR compared with the prior year.

According to annualized YE2019 financials, the debt service coverage ratio was 1.07 times (x) compared with 1.25x at YE2018, representing a 8.0% decline in NCF since the prior period. While revenue slightly improved in 2019, the decline over the prior period was primarily fueled by an increase in operating expenses.

DBRS Morningstar reanalyzed the NCF derived at issuance for the subject rating action to confirm its consistency with the “DBRS Morningstar North American Commercial Real Estate Property Analysis Criteria.” The resulting NCF figure was $28 million and DBRS Morningstar applied a cap rate of 8.52%, which resulted in a DBRS Morningstar Value of $328.7 million, a variance of 54.3% from the appraised value of $718.6 million at issuance. The DBRS Morningstar Value implies an LTV of 105% compared with the LTV of 48.1% on the appraised value at issuance.

The cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is at the middle end of the range of DBRS Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for lodging properties, reflecting property’s excellent quality and strong sponsorship and management.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis, totaling 10% to account for property quality and market fundamentals.

CORONAVIRUS IMPACT ANALYSIS
DBRS Morningstar overlaid various scenarios incorporating MVDs consistent with the projections in the “Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: September Update” (https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/366542) to estimate the impact of coronavirus-related changes in asset performance on a tranche-by-tranche basis for the subject transaction. The scenarios included subjecting the most recent appraised collateral value to generalized CRE asset value decline projections with an assumption of approximately 45% under the moderate scenario. In cases where the rated debt exceeded the scenario value, DBRS Morningstar assumed that a principal writedown had occurred to account for the difference. Because of the reverse-sequential allocation of losses in CMBS transactions, DBRS Morningstar’s analysis considered the most subordinate certificate first and, if a complete principal writedown of the certificate had occurred during the scenario, DBRS Morningstar repeated the analysis for the second-most subordinate certificate and so on until the rated debt no longer exceeded the scenario value.

Under the moderate scenario, the cumulative rated debt was insulated from loss.

The DBRS Morningstar ratings assigned to Classes B, C, D, E, and F had variances that were generally higher than those results implied by the LTV Sizing Benchmarks when market value declines are assumed under the Coronavirus Impact Analysis. These classes remain Under Review with Negative Implications as DBRS Morningstar continues to monitor the evolving economic impact of coronavirus-induced stress on the transaction.

A description of how DBRS Morningstar considers ESG factors within the DBRS Morningstar analytical framework and its methodologies can be found at: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/357792.

Classes X-NCP is interest-only (IO) certificate that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

All ratings are subject to surveillance, which could result in ratings being upgraded, downgraded, placed under review, confirmed, or discontinued by DBRS Morningstar.

DBRS Morningstar provides updated analysis and in-depth commentary in the DBRS Viewpoint platform for this transaction.

For complimentary access to this content, please register for the DBRS Viewpoint platform at www.viewpoint.dbrsmorningstar.com. The platform includes loan-level data for most outstanding CMBS transactions (including non-DBRS Morningstar-rated), as well as loan-level and transaction-level commentary for most DBRS Morningstar-rated and -monitored transactions.

Notes:
All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodologies are the North American Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology (March 1, 2020) and North American CMBS Surveillance Methodology (March 6, 2020), which can be found on www.dbrsmorningstar.com under Methodologies & Criteria. For a list of the structured-finance-related methodologies that may be used during the rating process, please see the DBRS Morningstar Global Structured Finance Related Methodologies document, which can be found on www.dbrsmorningstar.com in the Commentary tab under Regulatory Affairs. Please note that not every related methodology listed under a principal structured finance asset class methodology may be used to rate or monitor an individual structured finance or debt obligation.

For more information regarding rating methodologies and Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), please see the following DBRS Morningstar press release: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/357883.

For more information regarding structured finance rating methodologies and Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), please see the following DBRS Morningstar press release: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/358308.

For more information regarding the structured finance rating approach and Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), please see the following DBRS Morningstar press release: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/359905.

The rated entity or its related entities did participate in the rating process for this rating action. DBRS Morningstar had access to the accounts and other relevant internal documents of the rated entity or its related entities in connection with this rating action.

Please see the related appendix for additional information regarding the sensitivity of assumptions used in the rating process. Please note a sensitivity analysis is not performed for CMBS bonds rated CCC or lower. The DBRS Morningstar long-term rating scale definition indicates that ratings of CCC or lower are assigned when the bond is highly likely to default or default is imminent, thereby prevailing over a sensitivity analysis.

DBRS Morningstar’s North American CMBS analytical team will continue to monitor the transaction to evaluate the increased risk factors related to the coronavirus pandemic. As information (e.g., updated property-level financials, Smith Travel Research Reports, new valuations for specially serviced loans, and workout and/or modification specifics, if applicable) becomes available, DBRS Morningstar will address the Under Review with Negative Implications rating actions over the near to moderate term. DBRS Morningstar typically endeavors to resolve an Under Review rating action within 90 days, but the circumstances surrounding these rating actions (i.e., the unknown length of the pandemic-related downturn) may result in a prolonged resolution period.

For more information on this credit or on this industry, visit www.dbrsmorningstar.com or contact us at info@dbrsmorningstar.com.

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