DBRS Morningstar Finalises Provisional Ratings on Finance Ireland RMBS No. 3 DAC

DBRS Ratings GmbH (DBRS Morningstar) finalised its provisional ratings on the following residential mortgage-backed floating-rate notes issued by Finance Ireland RMBS No. 3 DAC (the Issuer):

-- Class A rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B rated AA (sf)
-- Class C rated A (sf)
-- Class D rated BBB (sf)
-- Class E rated BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F rated B (high) (sf)
-- Class X rated BB (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar does not rate the Class Y and Class Z notes also issued in the transaction.

The rating on the Class A notes addresses the timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal. The ratings on the Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E notes address the timely payment of interest once most senior and the ultimate repayment of principal on or before the final maturity date. The ratings on Class X and F notes address the ultimate payment of interest and principal.

The Issuer is a bankruptcy-remote, special-purpose vehicle incorporated in Ireland. The issued notes have been used to fund the purchase of Irish residential mortgage loans originated by Finance Ireland Credit Solutions DAC (Finance Ireland) and Pepper Finance Corporation DAC (Pepper).

Since 2018, Finance Ireland has been offering residential mortgage loans within the Irish market distributed by regulated intermediaries. Finance Ireland’s residential mortgages are available exclusively through appointed mortgage brokers. Pepper began originating mortgage loans in 2016, and in December 2018, it sold its mortgage business to Finance Ireland.

All mortgages have been originated post-crisis and in accordance with the new mortgage code of conduct. As of 31 May2021, the mortgage portfolio aggregated to EUR 297.5 million. All loans were originated between 2016 and 2021, but 94.7% of the pool has been originated in the past 11 months (i.e., from July 2020 to May 2021) as loans pre-dating the second half of 2020 have been securitised under the previous transactions, Finance Ireland RMBS No. 1 and Finance Ireland RMBS No. 2.

The beneficial interest of the mortgage loans will be transferred to the Issuer whereas the legal titles of the mortgage loans will remain with Finance Ireland. Pepper will also service the mortgage portfolio, with Intertrust Management Ireland Limited acting as the backup servicer facilitator. Pepper’s servicing capabilities are appropriate to monitor and manage the performance of its mortgage book and securitised mortgage portfolios. In DBRS Morningstar’s view, this setup can mitigate a potential servicer termination and therefore remedy potential interest shortfalls arising from operational issues.

The Class A notes will benefit from an amortising liquidity reserve fund (ALRF) providing liquidity support for items senior in the waterfall to payments of interest on the Class A notes. The liquidity reserve will have a target amount equal to 0.75% of the outstanding Class A notes balance, down to a floor of EUR 1 million. While the amortised amounts are released through the revenue waterfall, the final release of the floor occurs through the principal waterfall when the sum of principal available funds and the ALRF floor is enough to fully redeem the Class A notes.

The general reserve fund provides credit support for the rated notes. The general reserve will have a target amount equal to 0.75% of the outstanding balance of the Class A to Class F notes less the ALRF amount.

Class B to Class F are locked out of support if there is an outstanding principal deficiency ledger (PDL) balance on the respective class ledger. However, when they are the most-senior classes outstanding, the support will be available regardless of PDL debiting. The general reserve fund can only be used after the ALRF, but in priority to principal to cover the interest shortfalls and debited PDLs. While the amortised amounts are released through the revenue waterfall, the final release of the floor occurs through the principal waterfall when the sum of principal available funds and available reserve fund is enough to fully redeem the Class F notes.

Credit enhancement for the Class A notes is calculated at 17.2% and is provided by the subordination of the Class B to Class Z notes and the reserve funds. Credit enhancement for the Class B notes is calculated at 11.2% and is provided by the subordination of the Class C to Class Z notes and the reserve funds. Credit enhancement for the Class C notes is calculated at 8.0% and is provided by the subordination of the Class D to Class Z notes and the reserve funds. Credit enhancement for the Class D notes is calculated at 5.0% and is provided by the subordination of the Class E to Class Z notes and the reserve funds. Credit enhancement for the Class E notes is calculated at 3.0% and is provided by the subordination of the Class Z notes and the reserve funds. Credit enhancement for the Class F notes is calculated at 2.0% and is provided by the subordination of the Class Z notes and the reserve funds.

A key structural feature is the provisioning mechanism in the transaction that is linked to the arrears status of a loan besides the usual provisioning based on losses. The degree of provisioning increases in line with increases in the number of months in a loan’s arrears status. This is positive for the transaction as provisioning based on the arrears status traps any excess spread much earlier for a loan that may ultimately end up in foreclosure.

The Issuer will enter into a fixed-to-floating balance guaranteed swap agreement with BNP Paribas SA (rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) which, in combination with the fixed-rate floor of 200 basis points (bps) over the then-prevailing mid-swap rate for loans that reset or switch to fixed-rate loans, will lock in a post-swap margin of at least 187 bps for all loans that reset to a new fixed rate or switch to a fixed rate before the step-up date. To hedge the floating-rate portion of the portfolio, the loans that are currently paying a standard variable rate (SVR) rate, revert to SVR, or switch to SVR are subject to a minimum rate of one-month Euribor (floored at zero) plus 240 bps.

Borrower collections are held with The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland (rated A (low) with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) and are deposited on the next business day into the Issuer transaction account held with Elavon Financial Services DAC, UK Branch. DBRS Morningstar’s private rating on the Issuer Account Bank is consistent with the threshold for the account bank outlined in its “Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions” methodology, given the ratings assigned to the notes.

DBRS Morningstar based its ratings on a review of the following analytical considerations:
-- The transaction capital structure and form and sufficiency of available credit enhancement.
-- The credit quality of the mortgage portfolio and the ability of the servicer to perform collection and resolution activities. DBRS Morningstar calculated probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and expected loss (EL) outputs on the mortgage portfolio. The PD, LGD, and EL are used as an input into DBRS Morningstar’s cash flow tool. DBRS Morningstar analysed the mortgage portfolio in accordance with its “Master European Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Rating Methodology and Jurisdictional Addenda”.
-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow assumptions and repay the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E, and Class F notes according to the terms of the transaction documents. DBRS Morningstar analysed the transaction structure using Intex DealMaker.
-- The DBRS Morningstar sovereign rating of A (high)/R-1 (middle) with Stable trends (as of the date of this press release) on the Republic of Ireland.
-- The consistency of the legal structure with DBRS Morningstar’s “Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions” methodology and the presence of legal opinions addressing the assignment of the assets to the Issuer.

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the resulting isolation measures have caused an economic contraction, leading in some cases to increases in unemployment rates and income reductions for borrowers. DBRS Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to increase in the coming months for many structured finance transactions, some meaningfully. The ratings are based on additional analysis and, where appropriate, adjustments to expected performance as a result of the global efforts to contain the spread of the coronavirus. For this transaction, DBRS Morningstar incorporated an increase in probability of default for certain borrower characteristics, and conducted additional sensitivity analysis to determine that the transaction benefits from sufficient liquidity support to withstand potential high levels of payment holidays in the portfolio.

On 16 April 2020, the DBRS Morningstar Sovereign group released a set of macroeconomic scenarios for the 2020–22 period in select economies. These scenarios were last updated on 18 June 2021. For details, see the following commentaries: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/380281/global-macroeconomic-scenarios-june-2021-update and https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/359903/global-macroeconomic-scenarios-application-to-credit-ratings. The DBRS Morningstar analysis considered impacts consistent with the moderate scenario in the referenced reports.

On 14 June 2021, DBRS Morningstar updated its 5 May 2020 commentary outlining the impact of the coronavirus crisis on performance of DBRS Morningstar-rated RMBS transactions in Europe one year on. For more details, please see: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/380094/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-european-mortgage-performance-one-year-on and https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/360599/european-rmbs-transactions-risk-exposure-to-coronavirus-covid-19-effect.

For more information regarding rating methodologies and Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), please see the following DBRS Morningstar press release: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/357883.

For more information regarding structured finance rating methodologies and Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), please see the following DBRS Morningstar press release: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/358308.

For more information regarding the structured finance rating approach and Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), please see the following DBRS Morningstar press release: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/359905.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS
A description of how DBRS Morningstar considers ESG factors within the DBRS Morningstar analytical framework can be found in the DBRS Morningstar Criteria: Approach to Environmental, Social, and Governance Risk Factors in Credit Ratings at https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/373262

Notes:
All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodology applicable to the ratings is: “Master European Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Rating Methodology and Jurisdictional Addenda” (14 January 2021).

Other methodologies referenced in this transaction are listed at the end of this press release. These may be found at: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/about/methodologies.

DBRS Morningstar has applied the principal methodology consistently and conducted a review of the transaction in accordance with the principal methodology.

For a more detailed discussion of the sovereign risk impact on Structured Finance ratings, please refer to “Appendix C: The Impact of Sovereign Ratings on Other DBRS Morningstar Credit Ratings” of the “Global Methodology for Rating Sovereign Governments” at: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/364527/global-methodology-for-rating-sovereign-governments.

The source of information used for these ratings was Finance Ireland. DBRS Morningstar received the loan-by-loan payment history of the pool to be securitised (starting from 2016) and the current loan-by-loan data template as of 30 April 2021, provided in European Data Warehouse format.

DBRS Morningstar did not rely upon third-party due diligence in order to conduct its analysis.

DBRS Morningstar was supplied with third-party assessments. However, this did not impact the rating analysis.

DBRS Morningstar considers the data and information available to it for the purposes of providing these ratings to be of satisfactory quality.

DBRS Morningstar does not audit or independently verify the data or information it receives in connection with the rating process.

These ratings concern a newly issued financial instrument. These are the first DBRS Morningstar ratings on this financial instrument.

This is the first rating action since the Initial Rating Date.

Information regarding DBRS Morningstar ratings, including definitions, policies, and methodologies, is available on www.dbrsmorningstar.com.

To assess the impact of changing the transaction parameters on the rating, DBRS Morningstar considered the following stress scenarios, as compared to the parameters used to determine the rating (the Base Case):

-- In respect of the Class A notes, a PD of 27.0% and LGD of 61.8%, corresponding to the AAA (sf) rating scenario, was stressed assuming a 25% and 50% increase in the PD and LGD, respectively.
-- In respect of the Class B notes, a PD of 19.9% and LGD of 49.9%, corresponding to the AA (sf) rating scenario, was stressed assuming a 25% and 50% increase in the PD and LGD, respectively.
-- In respect of the Class C notes, a PD of 15.6% and LGD of 43.9%, corresponding to the A (sf) rating scenario, was stressed assuming a 25% and 50% increase in the PD and LGD, respectively.
-- In respect of the Class D notes, a PD of 11.1% and LGD of 35.9%, corresponding to the BBB (sf) rating scenario, was stressed assuming a 25% and 50% increase in the PD and LGD, respectively.
-- In respect of the Class E notes, a PD of 7.2% and LGD of 29.8%, corresponding to the BB (high) (sf) rating scenario, was stressed assuming a 25% and 50% increase in the PD and LGD, respectively.
-- In respect of the Class F notes, a PD of 4.4% and LGD of 21.3%, corresponding to the B (high) (sf) rating scenario, was stressed assuming a 25% and 50% increase in the PD and LGD, respectively.
-- In respect of the Class X notes, a PD of 5.3% and LGD of 24.0%, corresponding to the BB (low) (sf) rating scenario, was stressed assuming a 25% and 50% increase in the PD and LGD, respectively.

DBRS Morningstar concludes the following impact on the rated notes:

Class A:
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class A notes to AA (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class A notes to AA (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class A notes at AA (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the ratings of the Class A notes to AA (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class A notes to AA (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class A notes to AA (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class A notes to AA (low) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class A notes to A (high) (sf).

Class B:
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to downgrade of the Class B notes to AA (low) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class B notes to A (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class B notes to AA (low) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the ratings of the Class B notes to A (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class B notes to A (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class B notes to A (low) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class B notes to A (low) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class B notes to BBB (high) (sf).

Class C:
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class C notes to BBB (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class C notes to BBB (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class C notes to A (low) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the ratings of the Class C notes to BBB (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class C notes to BBB (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class C notes to BBB (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class C notes to BBB (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class C notes to BBB (low) (sf).

Class D:
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class D notes to BBB (low) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class D notes to BB (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class D notes to BBB (low) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the ratings of the Class D notes to BBB (low) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class D notes to BB (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class D notes to BB (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class D notes to BB (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class D notes to BB (sf).

Class E:
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead downgrade of the Class E notes BB (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E notes to BB (low) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to downgrade of the Class E notes to BB (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the ratings of the Class E notes to BB (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E notes to BB (low) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E notes to BB (low) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E notes to B (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E notes to B (high) (sf).

Class F:
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead downgrade of the Class F notes to B (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class F notes to CCC (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to downgrade of the Class F notes to B (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the ratings of the Class F notes to B (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class F notes to B (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class F notes to CCC (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class F notes to CCC (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class F notes to CCC (sf).

Class X:
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead downgrade of the Class X notes to B (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class X notes to B (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to downgrade of the Class X notes to B (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the ratings of the Class X notes to B (high) (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class X notes to B (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class X notes to B (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class X notes to CCC (sf).
-- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class X notes to CCC (sf).

For further information on DBRS Morningstar historical default rates published by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in a central repository, see: http://cerep.esma.europa.eu/cerep-web/statistics/defaults.xhtml. DBRS Morningstar understands further information on DBRS Morningstar historical default rates may be published by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) on its webpage: https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/credit-rating-agencies.

These ratings are endorsed by DBRS Ratings Limited for use in the United Kingdom.

Lead Analyst: Hrishikesh Oturkar, Assistant Vice President
Rating Committee Chair: Ketan Thaker, Managing Director
Initial Rating Date: 9 June 2021

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Geschäftsführer: Detlef Scholz
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The rating methodologies used in the analysis of this transaction can be found at: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/about/methodologies.

-- Master European Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Rating Methodology and Jurisdictional Addenda (14 January 2021) and European RMBS Credit Model v 1.0.0.0, https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/372339/master-european-residential-mortgage-backed-securities-rating-methodology-and-jurisdictional-addenda.
-- DBRS Morningstar Criteria: Approach to Environmental, Social, and Governance Risk Factors in Credit Ratings (3 February 2021), https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/373262/dbrs-morningstar-criteria-approach-to-environmental-social-and-governance-risk-factors-in-credit-ratings.
-- Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions (6 April 2021), https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/376314/legal-criteria-for-european-structured-finance-transactions.
-- Derivative Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions (24 September 2020), https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/367092/derivative-criteria-for-european-structured-finance-transactions.
-- Interest Rate Stresses for European Structured Finance Transactions (28 September 2020), https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/367292/interest-rate-stresses-for-european-structured-finance-transactions.
-- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance Servicers (19 November 2020), https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/370270/operational-risk-assessment-for-european-structured-finance-servicers.
-- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance Originators (30 September 2020), https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/367603/operational-risk-assessment-for-european-structured-finance-originators.

A description of how DBRS Morningstar analyses structured finance transactions and how the methodologies are collectively applied can be found at: http://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/278375.

For more information on this credit or on this industry, visit www.dbrsmorningstar.com or contact us at info@dbrsmorningstar.com.